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RATIONAL 
RECONSTRUCTIONS 
AND ARCHITECTURAL 
KNOWLEDGE
The “rational reconstruction” of the title stems from the thought of Imre Lakatos, 
from his logic of scientic discovery as constructed in the essay and book titled 
The Methodology of Scientic Research Programmes.1 Lakatos, a student of 
Karl Popper, retained his mentor’s fallibilism—there is no certainty in our intel-
lectual pursuits—but rejected Popper’s falsicationism—the growth of knowl-
edge through the assertion of bold hypotheses tested to failure (to state Popper’s 
position without the appropriate subtleties). Lakatos’ methodological unit of 
inquiry was not that of Popper, not Popper’s theory, or concatenation of theories, 
but rather research programs as set out in Lakatos’ methodology.
Long ago I made an attempt to place Lakatos’ epistemological position into 
the architectural discourse.2 In this paper I rely more directly on another of Laka-
tos’ essays, “History of science and its rational reconstructions.”3 However, the 
1 The essay, rst published in 1970, appears in an edited version as “Falsication and the Meth-
odology of Scientic Research Programmes.” In: Imre Lakatos: The Methodology of Scientic 
Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), I: pp. 8 – 101.
2 Stanford Anderson: “Architectural Design as a System of Research Programmes,“ and “Archi-
tectural Research Programmes in the Work of Le Corbusier,” Design Studies (London), V (July 
1984), pp. 146 – 158. Reprinted in K. Michael Hays, ed.: Architecture|Theory|since 1968 (Cam-
bridge: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 490 – 505.
3 Imre Lakatos: “History of Science and its Rational Reconstruction.” In: see note 1, I: pp. 102 –138.
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argument of Lakatos’ essay on history is entailed by his Research Programs, and 
thus I cannot avoid a brief consideration of Lakatos’ main essay.
Lakatos’ research programs
According to Lakatos’ methodology, the unit of appraisal in scientic discovery 
is not a theory or even a conjunction of theories, but rather a research program 
(g. 1). He describes the program as composed of a “hard core” that is sustained 
for the life of the program, a band of “auxiliary hypotheses” that are revised in 
order to sustain the logic of the program as it confronts new conditions, and a 
“positive heuristic” that guides the course of the inquiry.
The hard core is not a matter of truth. Fundamental to Lakatos’ thought, 
and perhaps counter-intuitive, is this: What Lakatos terms the ‘hard core’ of a 
research program is accepted by convention and, during the pursuit of the pro-
gram, the hard core is methodologically considered irrefutable. Now, quoting from 
Lakatos, the hard core, joined with a ‘positive heuristic,’ “… denes problems, 
outlines the construction of a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, foresees anomalies 
and turns them victoriously into examples, all according to a preconceived plan. 
… It is primarily the positive heuristic of his programme, not the anoma-
lies, which dictate the choice of his problems. Only when the driving force of 
the positive heuristic weakens, may more attention be given to anomalies. The 
methodology of research programmes can explain in this way the high degree of 
autonomy of theoretical science.”4
Lakatos’ autonomy and its limits
What Lakatos’ explanation of the hard core may not adequately emphasize is 
this: it is the methodologically sustained hard core that provides a high-degree of 
autonomy to the enterprise. Thus autonomy is not given by some absolute foun-
4 Ibid., pp. 110 – 111. The following paragraphs are indebted to the following pages of the same 
essay.
Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
New methodological unit: not theory, but research programs.
Fallibilism without Falsificationism
Research program
Hard core
----------------Positive heuristic - - - - - - - - - - ->
Auxiliary hypotheses
The Hard core is asserted and maintained by convention. For the life of 
the program it is considered irrefutable.
This accounts for the “high degree of autonomy of theoretical science.”
Fig. 1. Diagram of Imre 
Lakatos’ Methodology of 
Research Programs.
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dation, but rather is asserted, held by convention, in order that an intellectual (or 
creative) enterprise can be conducted—and that enterprise is to be judged by its 
results rather than by some ultimate authority. Autonomy without authority.
So, with Lakatos, anything goes? Thanks to the methodologically-held hard 
core, programs can, and indeed should, be held tenaciously. Yet research pro-
grams can be assessed. One program, in its development, may predict a novel 
fact and thus show itself to be “theoretically progressive.” That prediction may 
be corroborated, and thus the program is also “empirically progressive.” “Pro-
gram shifts” of another program may be degenerative. For example, a competing 
program may lag behind in prediction and incorporate new facts only by ad hoc, 
increasingly complex, auxiliary hypotheses introduced solely to sustain the pro-
gram’s hard core.
Lakatos does not assume that the apparently degenerative program can be 
denitively eliminated—he is a fallibilist, we have no certainty. Nonetheless, to 
use a Popperian term, a demarcation, though one less rigid than with Popper, is 
drawn between science and pseudo-science thanks to the critical analysis and 
comparison of programs.
Lakatos’ historiography: External and internal history
There is of course much more to be said about Lakatos’ methodology, but for 
current purposes I wish to move on to its implications for history. Lakatos 
asserts that any methodology also constitutes a historiographic research 
program.5 With Lakatos, for example, the historian is led to look for research 
programs and progressive or degenerating problem shifts within the programs. 
This constitutes the internal history of the program. Note that Lakatos, con-
cerned with science, speaks of rival research programs, and looks to those 
occasions where one program defeats another. Looking to architecture, for the 
word “rival” I would substitute “competing,” as it would be more common that 
5 Ibid., p. 114.
Fig. 2. Le Corbusier, Villa 
at Garches, France, 1927.
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multiple programs can thrive. In the arts, some programs may lose their force, 
but “defeat” may be rare.
Any internal history must be supplemented with an external history. What 
research programs are established, which ones thrive or may disappear for lack 
of support, are largely issues external to the program itself. However, in Laka-
tos’ formulation, it is possible that what for others would be seen as external 
to scientic research may be held within the program and thus in the internal 
history.
Research programs in the work of Le Corbusier
Here I recall my effort to recognize research programs in the work of Le Cor-
busier, but now give more emphasis to the related issue of internal history.6 I as-
sert, and it is a common claim, that Le Corbusier’s Five Points and his villas of 
the late ‘20s constitute a signicant innovation in the discipline of architecture 
(g. 2). I see them as parts of a research program and thus as the subject of an 
internal history. They emerge as contributions to knowledge, to the autonomy of 
architecture.
Le Corbusier’s achievement took place in the context of, and requires the 
presence of certain material conditions. In accord with Lakatos, these material, 
and seemingly external conditions, may be assigned to both the internal and ex-
ternal history of the program, as I will later demonstrate. Especially in a eld like 
architecture, it is precisely because some material matters must be assigned to 
the program and its internal history that I prefer to speak of the quasi-autono-
my rather than the autonomy of architecture.
Commentators often locate the underlying concept of the Five Points in Le 
Corbusier’s famous perspective drawing of the skeleton of the Maison Dom-ino, 
a work that precedes the Five Points by more than a decade (gs. 3, 4). This, 
despite the fact that Le Corbusier, in the rst volume of his Oeuvre complète, in 
6 The reference is to my “Architectural Research Programmes in the Work of Le Corbusier.”
Fig. 3. Le Corbusier, Mai-
son Dom-ino: clockwise 
from top left: transverse 
section; reflected ceiling 
plan/horizontal section; 
foundations; skeleton 
perspective, 1914; from 
his Oeuvre complète: 1910-
1929, 1930.
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his presentation of the Maisons Dom-ino project, relates that 1914 work not to 
the Five Points and the villas of the late 1920s, but rather to the cognate housing 
project of the Maison Loucheur of 1929.7 Admittedly, the Maisons Loucheur do 
modestly draw on the Five Points, but the implication of Le Corbusier’s reference 
is to continue to see the Maisons Dom-ino as the beginning of an experiment in 
rationalized social housing rather than as the seed of an intrinsically architec-
tural innovation. In so doing, Le Corbusier is consistent with what I will call the 
external history of the Maison Dom-ino project.
The Maison Dom-ino project was distinctly pragmatic in its origins; its premis-
es are more fully revealed by attention not only to the famous “ossature” perspec-
tive, but especially to other Dom-ino project drawings: plans, detail drawings, and 
perspectives of possible houses/housing based on the project (gs. 3, 5). The proj-
ect grew out of Le Corbusier’s interest to develop a system using the relatively new 
technology of reinforced concrete, calculated to meet the severe housing needs in 
Flanders, an area particularly devastated by the locally sustained battles of World 
War I. Le Corbusier sought to form an industrialized company for production of the 
rationalized frame system that could be deployed and then in-lled locally. Under 
then current exigencies the inll might include rubble from destroyed buildings, 
though Le Corbusier also envisioned industrialized in-ll systems.8 
The reflected ceiling plan of the Maison Dom-ino shows that it did not involve 
“slabs” in the usual sense of that word as monolithic concrete floors (g. 3). 
Rather it is a framework of cast-in-place girders and beams formed by small re-
petitive cement or tile units, destined to have a plaster ceiling. For stability, inll 
walls would then have preferred locations on the structural lines. Referring to the 
Maison Dom-ino plans, there is no innovative exploitation of structure or space 
7 Le Corbusier: Le Corbusier: The Complete Architectural Works, Volume I 1910 – 1929 (origi-
nal edition, Zürich: Girsberger, 1930); in the English edition (London: Thames and Hudson, 1964) 
the Maisons Dom-ino project is presented on pp. 23 – 29; the Maisons Loucheur, pp. 198 – 200.
8 See Eleanor Gregh: “The Dom-ino Idea,” Oppositions 15/16 (1979), pp. 60 – 87.
Fig. 4. Le Corbusier, “Five 
Points” as published in 
his Oeuvre complete, 1930.
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(g. 5). Whenever possible, columns are buried in walls. Where an interior wall is 
of lesser dimension than a column, the exposed part of the column is boxed-in or 
projected into the less signicant space. Neither is the structure emphasized nor 
is the planning free from the structure. The cantilevered space beyond the col-
umns on the long sides of the building merely sets the dimensions of insignicant 
spaces. Where a principal room is projected through that space, there is no dis-
tinct recognition of space within or beyond the column line. In brief, examination 
of the Maison Dom-ino project as a whole, and as it was propounded in 1914, re-
veals nothing of the Five Points, including the free plan.
Examination of all the drawings of the Maisons Dom-ino project, not just the 
famous perspective drawing of the skeleton, convinces me that Le Corbusier’s 
thought and work of the time is fully accounted for by the external historical and 
technical conditions then under consideration.
Internal history and Le Corbusier’s early work
Nonetheless, later events have allowed commentators to make larger claims for 
the Maison Dom-ino project that can be accepted if we also conceive of “internal 
histories.” The Five Points were rst adumbrated, still in incomplete form, in con-
junction with Le Corbusier’s projects for the Weissenhof Siedlung in Stuttgart of 
1927 (g. 6).9 Published in several forms by Le Corbusier in the mid-1920s (g. 7), 
9 Le Corbusier: “Calendrier d‘architecture“ in his Almanach d’architecture moderne (Paris: G. 
Crès, 1926). Here, Le Corbusier makes an extended presentation within which, with hindsight, one 
can discern the Five Points. The Five Points are, however, stated succinctly, as points, in two publica-
tions associated with the Weissenhof exhibition: Le Corbusier and Pierre Jeanneret, “Fünf Punkte 
zu einer neuen Architektur.” In: Deutscher Werkbund, Bau und Wohnung: Die Bauten der Weis-
senhofsiedlung (Stuttgart: F. Wedekind, 1927), pp. 27 – 28; and in Alfred Roth: Zwei Wohnhäuser von 
Le Corbusier und Pierre Jeanneret (Stuttgart: F. Wedekind, 1928). In “Ou en est l’architecture?,” 
l’Architecture vivante (Autumn/Winter 1927), pp. 7 – 29, Le Corbusier lists six points, adding one on 
the “suppression of the cornice.” His discussion is heavily weighted to issues of snow on flat roofs and 
to his sixth point—not to what one would deem the more important architectural issues. Since this is 
a publication of late 1927, the concern to defend flat roofs in northern winter conditions is probably 
Fig. 5. Le Corbusier, Mai-
son Dom-ino, typical 
plans, 1914, from his Oeu-
vre complet.
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7
the Five Points can, through a rational reconstruction, be seen as part of an in-
ternal history of the Maisons Dom-ino project. The Five Points, like the Maison 
Dom-ino, are premised on a reinforced concrete frame. In the Maison Dom-ino, 
the independence of the bottom floor plate from the ground may be taken as an 
anticipation of the pilotis. The stair does ascend to the roof and some of the 
drawings show people and plantings at the roof. Horizontally extended windows 
are hinted at. The key point, the free plan, is missing, though, with hindsight, its 
potential can be recognized.
With the Maisons Dom-ino, Le Corbusier made a relatively modest architectur-
al proposition, but his own efforts more than a decade later constitute a rational 
reconstruction of the original proposition—a reconstruction that opened a genu-
ine architectural innovation. That rational reconstruction is part of an internal 
history of a signicant part of Le Corbusier’s rst decades of production. Today 
we do not accord the Five Points the necessity that Le Corbusier then attrib-
uted to them. On the other hand, the Five Points are so intrinsic to architectural 
thought that it is a conscious decision to adopt them—or not. The Five Points are 
a contribution to the quasi-autonomy of the discipline of architecture.
Peter Eisenman, the Maisons Dom-ino, and self-referentiality
Peter Eisenman’s early architectural work, his “Cardboard Architecture” houses, 
made commitments remarkably similar to what the famed New York art historian 
Meyer Schapiro had, sixty years earlier, in 1936, ironically anticipated from some 
future architect besotted with dreams of autonomy: such an architect would seek 
“in the name of a similar purity, … an art which conceals or suppresses the tec-
tonic, constructive elements as non-artistic, and which constructs independently 
of these factors its own effects of mass and space and light.” (g. 8)10
emphasized because of the heavy criticism of the flat roofs of the Weissenhof exhibition.
10 Meyer Schapiro: “The New Viennese School,” Art Bulletin, XVIII (1936), pp. 258 – 266. A criti-
cal review of Otto Pächt, ed., Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen II (Berlin: Frankfurter, 
Fig. 6. Le Corbusier, 
a dwelling for the 
Weissenhof Exhibition, 
Stuttgart, 1927.
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A notable version of autonomy in art involves the search for how works exhibit 
internal reference to themselves and their media. Self-referentiality, aside from its 
appearance in innovative art, including cinematography, from the late nineteenth 
century onward, had also been theorized. The major art theorist of mid-twentieth 
century New York, Clement Greenberg, built his theory, criticism, and indeed his 
history on the concept.11 Though his influence was soon to wane, Greenberg’s 
thought was compelling in the circles in which Eisenman moved in the years of 
his cardboard architecture. 
Accepting that self-referentiality dened modernism in the arts, Eisenman 
noted that architecture had been slow to adopt this Modernist stance. 
Eisenman’s cardboard architecture involved the ambition to bring modernist 
self-referentiality to the discipline of architecture, and thus to claim for himself a 
signicant position in the cultural world of New York and beyond.
In a 1979 essay, “Aspects of Modernism: Maisons Dom-ino and the Self-Refer-
ential Sign,” in his journal Oppositions, Peter Eisenman provided a new reading 
of the Maisons Dom-ino as an early precedent for “self-referential” architecture in 
the modern movement—and thus sought to give his thesis of self-referentiality a 
rmer theoretical base.12 Eisenman proposed a theoretical interpretation internal 
1933), Schapiro gives particular attention to Emil Kaufmann’s thought on autonomy in architec-
ture. Whether or not Eisenman knew of this comment by Schapiro, I nd it strangely anticipa-
tory of Eisenman’s work of the 1960s and early ‘70s. It is not inconceivable that Eisenman did 
know the Schapiro text. In 1959, Eisenman and I took art history courses at Columbia University, 
where Schapiro was so highly esteemed. Eisenman’s close relations with Colin Rowe in the im-
mediately ensuing years would also have kept him in contact with such publications and thought.
11 See the hugely influential collection of writings, Clement Greenberg: Art and Culture: Criti-
cal Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961); and now the esteemed critical study of Greenberg and 
his thought: Caroline Jones: Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg’s Modernism and the Bu-
reaucratization of the Senses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
12 Peter Eisenman: “Aspects of Modernism: Maison Dom-ino and the Self-Referential Sign,” Op-
positions 15/16 (Winter/Spring 1979), pp. 118 – 128; reprinted in K. Michael Hays, ed.: Opposi-
tions Reader (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), pp. 188 – 198.
Fig. 7 a-b. Le Corbusier, 
“Five Points” as presented 
in Buenos Aires, 1929.
PLE
N
U
M
 | 16
9
to the image of the Dom-ino skeleton—the perspective drawing of the “ossature” 
(g. 3). In so doing, Eisenman set aside the reigning interpretation of that work, 
stemming largely from the writings of his mentor Colin Rowe.13 Eisenman asserts 
that Rowe’s claim for the innovative modernity of the Maison Dom-ino, revealed 
fully in Le Corbusier’s great villas of the late 1920s, marks only one more instance 
of historical change in an established mode of representation. 
Rather than establishing a historical continuity, as he found in Rowe, Eisen-
man discerns features of the Maisons Dom-ino that he poses as a radical break 
with tradition. Relying solely on the famed perspective drawing of the skeleton 
of the Maisons Dom-ino, Eisenman enters upon a close description entailing 
such observations as the different lengths, A and B, of the sides of the slabs, 
the alignment of the slabs and the equal spacing of their vertical stacking (g. 
9a). The possibility of many variations of these factors is noted, and also that 
such variations entail little more than geometrical distinctions. However, in Le 
Corbusier’s “ossature” drawing, Eisenman notes, these features are what they 
are; his respect for Le Corbusier and the renown of the Maisons Dom-ino dia-
gram are such that he unquestioningly makes the assumption that there must 
be formal intentionality in the given conguration of the Maison Dom-ino skel-
eton. 
What then is that intentionality? Eisenman nds it to be crucially revealed in 
the relation of the columns to the slabs (g. 9b). The columns are set back from 
the long side of the slabs, but are close to the edge of the narrow ends of the 
slabs. Quoting Eisenman: “[As the difference, A versus B, of] the column locations 
acts to reinforce the original geometric A B relationship which in itself is so 
clear as not to need reinforcement, one interprets this as an intention to under-
score a condition of being, that is as a signicant redundancy. … The redundancy 
13 See, for example, Colin Rowe: “The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa,” Architectural Review 
(1947); reprinted in Rowe, The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1976), pp. 1 – 27.
Fig. 8. Peter Eisenman, 
House VI,  Connecticut, 
1972-75.
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of the mark thereby signals that there is something present other than either the 
geometry or the function of the column and slab.”14 
Eisenman concludes: “Thus, the fact itself—the slab—plus the spatial mark-
ing—the location of the columns—suggest an idea about sides A and B which is 
an idea only about itself, a self-referential statement. This then may be a primi-
tive though truly Modernist phenomenon, one that speaks about its mere exis-
tence and its own condition of being.”15 
As I read Eisenman’s account, he seems to locate his self-referential reading 
of the Maison Dom-ino in the intentions of Le Corbusier. Self-referentiality, he as-
serts, is found in the Maison Dom-ino. 
In any case, aside from the always near-impossible task of discerning inten-
tions, I nd that the entire set of Dom-ino drawings, as I argued above, under-
mines Eisenman’s account. The collection of drawings undermines Eisenman’s 
account if these drawings are examined according to a conventional, external 
historical account. But we need not read Eisenman’s account in that way. Indeed, 
he surely was not offering an external history of the Dom-ino project. Let us 
rather take Eisenman’s essay as a claim for yet another rational reconstruction 
of the Maison Dom-ino. We may recall that within Lakatos’ formulation, the hard 
core of a theoretical program may entail positions not realized by those who con-
structed it. Thus I have no issue with such an attempt by Eisenman, except to say 
that the claim must still withstand criticism. It is not fruitful to accept that the 
Maisons Dom-ino hard core can incorporate any interpretation. Of course, one is 
inclined to respect Eisenman’s claim to nd in Dom-ino an impetus for the kind 
of work that he was engaged in. Eisenman’s essay can be seen as generosity in 
acknowledging a source for his own thought. At the same time, one can raise the 
question of whether Eisenman was reading his position back on Le Corbusier. It 
is clear from Eisenman’s article that he sought to make Le Corbusier a pioneer in 
14 See note 12, p. 194.
15 Ibid.
9a, b. Peter Eisenman, dia-
grams of the Maison Dom-
ino skeleton drawing.
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an effort in which Eisenman was involved sixty years later and in so-doing to give 
Le Corbusier a modernist position that Eisenman could use to bludgeon a more 
conventional historian and theorist like his mentor Colin Rowe. For myself, I am 
not so convinced that Eisenman’s position can be rationally reconstructed in the 
Maisons Dom-ino ossature. 
Eisenman was involved in a different, honorable but different, research pro-
gram. But Le Corbusier might give luster to Eisenman? The roles of such things as 
redundancy or overtly atectonic elements establishing self-referential markings in 
Eisenman’s cardboard architecture remain, for me, so distant from the nature of 
the Maisons Dom-ino, that I must question an internal history of the Maisons Dom-
ino research program as incorporating Eisenman’s self-referentiality. But recall 
that I earlier suggested that something so fundamental to Le Corbusier’s achieve-
ment as the free plan is only to be visited upon the Maisons Dom-ino by seeing Le 
Corbusier’s research program as extended in time, incorporating the thought and 
work of the 1920s. That same extended research program, incorporating the inge-
nious complexities of Le Corbusier’s villas of the 1920s might provide an internal 
history that would connect with modernist self-referentiality—which was, after all, 
a contemporary phenomenon in other artistic ventures.
Quasi-autonomy
Returning to an earlier point: we may consider the widespread destruction in 
Flanders as an external history posing, as do so many other historical circum-
stances, the need and opportunity to address a housing crisis. But under what 
program? Viewing the extended history of the Maisons Dom-ino, one recognizes 
that Le Corbusier sought a distinctive architectural solution. However, one must 
also recognize external factors that were made internal to his research program: 
for example, the then still innovative reinforced concrete frame, the felt need for 
a rationalization of building practice, the presence of quantities of materials from 
ruined buildings that encouraged a distinction between structure and inll. Exter-
nal factors are integral to the internal history. There is an autonomous aspect to 
his extended Maisons Dom-ino program, but it has to be seen as “only” quasi-au-
tonomous. This is an important claim for the integrity and, yes, autonomy of the 
architectural discipline, but also that this discipline must always be understood to 
operate with and in external conditions. “With” and “in” because a research pro-
gram is typically facilitated by external history but also only becomes effective by 
selectively bringing some of that externality into the program.
To summarize my argument: Le Corbusier’s 1915 Maison Dom-ino project re-
ceives an adequate account with an external history.
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Le Corbusier’s achievements in the late 1920’s, the Five Points and the excep-
tional villas, require an internal history that incorporates the Maison Dom-ino 
project and certain external conditions.
Incidentally, I believe this internal history can be continued in Le Corbusier’s 
career, for example in the Carpenter Center at Harvard University. 
While Eisenman’s early architectural projects deserve an internal history of 
their own, I reject that one can nd its source in the Maison Dom-ino project of 
1914. At best it would be related to the continuity of Le Corbusier’s program, per-
haps down to the Carpenter Center—not as the model for Eisenman’s Cardboard 
Architecture, but perhaps as an instance of self-referentiality in architecture.
With these examples and others, I would argue that architecture does possess 
quasi-autonomous knowledge, incorporating internal and external conditions, 
that gives uniqueness to this discipline—allowing architecture to make its unique 
contributions to society and the environment.
Now I risk a bridge to a question put in the call for papers for this Bauhaus Col-
loquium: Can theory “assume a more constructive, projective role of influencing 
future [global] practice”? Pursuing neither abstruse theorization alone, nor 
simplistic rationalistic problem-solving, I suggest that the intellectual construct of 
research programs, and the quasi-autonomy of its selective incorporation of ex-
ternalities, can bring intellect and design and art to bear on societal conditions.
Finally, our conference program asked about “a more constructive, projective 
role of influencing future global practice.” Has my presentation addressed this 
question? How so? What are some possibilities?
• The logic of Research programs opposes meta-histories that would make of 
such phenomena as globalization a historical necessity or an unassailable force.
• The logic of Research programs reveals and values multiple lines of inquiry.
• The logic of Research programs is resistant to periodization and apparent 
necessities imposed by claims for a Zeitgeist.
• Modernity is not a period, but, as Foucault has said, an attitude.16 
• Modernity itself might be seen as a broad and extended research program. 
How do rationalism and the pursuit of liberty and justice, survive, adapt, and 
thrive under changing external conditions?
• Globalization should not be re-ied, periodized. It is not new in our time. It 
is not monolithic. It presents opportunities.
16 Michel Foucault: “What is Enlightenment.” In: Paul Rabinow (ed.): Foucault Reader (New 
York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 32 – 50.
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• Earlier positions may be rationally reconstructed to serve well in new 
circumstances.
• The internal history of architecture, and architectures, is more crucial than 
the conventional or external history.
• The logic of Research Programs offers internal histories that recognize what 
architecture can uniquely bring to the table, but nonetheless also recognizes the 
quasi-autonomy of architecture – that it must engage its social and technical 
dimensions.
I am ready to join in severe criticism of what the Colloquium has termed “Em-
pire,” but we may nonetheless recognize some promising conditions within global-
ism. Do our patterns of global activity provide also a positive breeding ground: for 
example, does it provide conditions and opportunities that facilitate interchange, 
learning and understanding, that, whether observed at the level of individuals or 
societies, nurture a robust form of cosmopolitanism, encouraging and making 
provision for world-citizens?
If so, then, in the realm of architecture, one might share the fruit of our ratio-
nal reconstructions: quasi-autonomous architectural knowledge that is not local 
in concept but capable of acting locally and responsibly.
